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Ce texte est une traduction faite du document Earthquake Tip 12 de IITK. Consulter ce lien pour la version originale (http://www.iitk.ac.in/nicee/EQTips/EQTip12.pdf)

Les bâtiments en maçonnerie sont des structures fragiles, et ils sont aussi parmi les plus vulnérables face aux fortes solicitations sismiques. Ceci peut être confirmé en constatant les dégâts dans ces constructions au cours des tremblements de terre. Il est donc très important d’améliorer leur comportement. Et pour atteindre cet objectif, un certain nombre de techniques peuvent être utilisées.

Les vibrations du sol lors d’un séisme engendrent des forces d’inertie sur toute la masse du bâtiment. Ces forces traversent le toit et les murs jusqu’à arriver aux fondations. Le but du dimensionnement parasismique c’est de faire en sorte que ces forces atteignent le sol sans causer de grands dommages au bâtiment. À titre de rappel, un bâtiment en maçonnerie a trois composantes: le toit, le mur et la foundation (Figure 1a). Mais les murs en sont les plus vulnérables. Un mur peut être facilement basculé si sa partie supérieure est poussée horizontalement dans une direction perpendiculaire à son plan (faible direction), mais offre beaucoup plus de résistance si cette force se situe dans son plan (direction forte) (Figure 1b).

Lors d’un séisme, le sol se déplace dans la direction verticale et aussi dans deux directions horizontales. Mais les vibrations horizontales sont les plus nuisibles pour les bâtiments en maçonnerie. Les forces d’inertie horizontales développées au toit se transfère sur les murs et agissent soit dans la direction faible soit dans la direction forte. Si tous les murs ne sont pas attachés ensemble comme une boîte, ceux qui sont chargés dans leur faible direction ont tendance à se renverser (figure 2a). Pour assurer une meillleure performance sismique, tous les murs doit être joints correctement aux murs adjacents. Ainsi, les murs chargés dans leur faible direction pourront prendre avantage de la bonne résistance latérale offerte par les murs qui sont chargés dans leur forte direction (Figure 2b). Les murs doivent également être attachés au toit et à la base pour préserver leur intégrité globale.

Comment améliorer la performance des murs en maçonnerie?
Les murs en maçonnerie sont élancés à cause de leur petite épaisseur par rapport à leur hauteur et leur longueur. Un moyen simple de les empêcher de se renverser pendant un tremblement de terre c’est de les bien lier avec le toit et avec les fondations comme une boîte en carton. Tout d’abord, les connexions entre les murs doivent être bien faites. Cela peut être atteint en (a) assurant une bonne jonction des murs dans les coins, et en (b) employant des bandes horizontales à différents niveaux, particulièrement au dessus des portes et des fenêtres. Deuxièmement, la taille des ouvertures des portes et des fenêtres doivent être petite. Plus les ouvertures sont petites, plus la résistance offerte par le mur est grande. Troisièmement, la tendance d’un mur à se renverser quand il poussé dans la direction faible peut être réduite en limitant ses rapports longueur sur épaisseur et hauteur sur épaisseur (Figure 3). Les codes de conception spécifient les limites pour ces rapports. Un mur trop haut ou trop long par rapport à son épaisseur, est particulièrement vulnérable aux tremblements de terre dans sa direction faible.

La performance sismique d’un mur en maçonnerie est très sensible aux propriétés de ses constituents. En Inde, les propriétés de ces matériaux varient en raison de la variation des matériaux de base et des méthodes de construction. La maçonnerie peut etre composée par exemple des briques d’argile (brûlés et non brûlés), de blocs de béton (pleins et creux), de blocs de pierre. Les briques d’argile brûlées sont les plus couramment utilisés. Ces briques sont intrinsèquement poreuses, et ainsi ils absorbent de l’eau. La porosité excessive est préjudiciable à un bon comportement de la maçonnerie parce que les briques aspirent l’eau du mortier adjacent, ce qui entraîne une mauvaise liaison entre la brique et le mortier et une difficulté à mettre la maçonnerie en place. Pour cette raison, les briques de faible porosité doivent être utilisées, et ils doivent être trempés dans l’eau avant d’être utilisés pour minimiser la quantité d’eau tirée du mortier.

Divers mortiers sont aussi utilisés: mortier de boue, mortier de ciment et de sable, ou mortier de ciment, de sable et de chaux. Parmi ceux-ci, le mortier de boue est le plus faible; il s’écrase facilement à sec, coule vers l’extérieur et possède une très faible résistance sismique. Le mortier de ciment et de sable à la chaux est le plus approprié. Ce mélange fournit une excellente ouvrabilité pour la pose des briques, peut s’étirer sans s’effondrer pendant un faible tremblement de terre, et se lie bien avec les briques. La réponse sismique des murs de maçonnerie dépend de la résistance relative des briques et du mortier. Les briques doivent être plus fortes que le mortier. Une trop grande épaisseur du mortier n’est pas souhaitable. Généralement, une couche de mortier de 10 mm d’épaisseur est pratiquement et esthétiquement satisfaisant. Les normes indiennes prescrivent les types préférés de briques et de mortier à utiliser dans les bâtiments pour chaque zone sismique.

Authors: Laguerre Marc-Ansy, Trimmino Marroquin Veronica
To anyone interested in learning about the evolution of the right to water in Haiti in respect to the Spiral Model, feel free to read our final paper. Be aware that this text is subject to copyright.

Introduction
The widespread lack of access to drinking water and proper sanitation systems is one of the most important obstacles in Haiti when it comes to complying with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The historical legacy of inequality, the political instability, weak state consolidation and corruption of the government, as well as the persistent levels of extreme poverty, have contributed to the systemic inability of the Haitian government to deliver potable water to its inhabitants. The lack of access to this crucial resource continues to impact all aspects of life for most Haitians, contributing to poor health, food shortages and declining educational opportunities, resulting in a vicious circle of contaminated water consumption, ineffective public hygiene, persistent health crises and, chronic and deeply rooted poverty (Varma M., et al, 2008).

Haiti became independent in 1804 after 13 years of revolution against France. Although it was a very prosperous colony, once independent, Haiti faced major social, political, environmental, and economic challenges. Two years after independence, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the founding father of the nation was assassinated, causing political instability characterized by authoritarian regimes for over 200 years. In 1915, president Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was killed by the population while trying to escape to the French embassy, which prompted the American Occupation that lasted until 1934. After a period of transition, from 1957 to 1986, Haiti lived under the tyrannical dictatorship of François Duvalier and his dynasty. After which Haiti transitioned into a “unstable” democracy, dominated by recurrent political instability, poor economic performance, chronic inequality and poverty, and environmental deterioration (Diamond, 2005). Haiti is also the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with an annual GDP per capita of 765.7 U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2017).

This research paper analyses the Right to Water in Haiti since its independence, using the Spiral Model developed by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, as a framework to explain the process of change, asses the outcomes and make a set of recommendations to push the process forward and advance to the next stage.

1. The Right to Water
The UN General Comment No. 15, in Paragraph 2, states that “The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements” (UN General Comment No. 15, 2002).

The Comment calls on the States Parties to “adopt effective measures to realize, without discrimination, the right to water”, based on 3 factors: the derivation of a right to water from Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR; the centrality, necessity and ineluctable place of water in the rights to life, liberty, and human dignity contained in the UDHR; and prior recognition of this right in other international legal instruments.

The Committee used those three elements to conclude that there is a human right to water, because this right is not explicitly provided for in the ICESCR, and because, by its nature, a General Comment does not alter the explicit provisions of the ICESCR, nor does it create new rights beyond the parameters of what is contained in the ICESCR.

1.1 Legal Background for the Right to Water
Water is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and health. The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity, and it is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.

In the UDHR, the process of implying rights is undertaken by relying on a well-established method of statutory interpretation in the realm of rights. That’s why water was not incorporated in this formulation, because it was considered implicitly included, in Articles 1,3 and 25(1), where the term ‘including’ shows that the component elements listed were not meant to form an all-inclusive list but serve as an indication of certain factors essential for an adequate standard of living. In this sense, satisfying standards of the Declaration cannot be done without water of sufficient quantity and quality to maintain human health and well-being.

1.2 Formal Recognition of The Right to Water
In July of 2010, For the first time, the UN General assembly formally recognized the right to water and sanitation in Resolution A/RES/64/292 and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realization of all human rights. The Resolution called upon States and international organizations to provide financial resources, help capacity-building and technology transfer to help countries, in particular developing countries, to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all.

Following the UN General Assembly resolution, in September of the same year, the Human Rights Council with Resolution A/HRC/RES/15/9 affirmed that the rights to water and sanitation are part of existing international law and confirmed that these rights are legally binding upon States. It also called upon States to develop appropriate tools and mechanisms to achieve progressively the full realization of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, including currently unserved and underserved areas.

 1.3 Substantive Dimensions of The Right to Water
UN General Comment 15 defines 3 substantive dimensions for the Right of Water:

Availability: The water supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous for personal and domestic uses. These uses ordinarily include drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, personal and household hygiene. The quantity of water available for each person should correspond to World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines. Some individuals and groups may also require additional water due to health, climate, and work conditions.

Quality: The water required for each personal or domestic use must be safe, therefore free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health. Furthermore, water should be of an acceptable color, odor and taste for each personal or domestic use.

Accessibility: Water, water facilities and services must be accessible to everyone without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party. Accessibility has four overlapping dimensions:

1. Physical accessibility: water, and adequate water facilities and services, must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population.
2. Economic accessibility: Water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable for all. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must be affordable and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant rights.
3. Non-discrimination: Water and water facilities and services must be accessible to all, including the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds.
4. Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive and impart information concerning water issues.

1.4 Entitlements and Obligations of the State
The Right to Water implies certain entitlements and obligations for the state to respect, protect and fulfill the right.

Respect: The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to water.

Protect: The obligation to protect requires States to prevent third parties from interfering with the right to water. States should adopt legislation or other measures to ensure that private actors—e.g., industry, water providers or individuals—comply with human rights standards related to the right to water.

Fulfill: The obligation to fulfill requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures to fully realize the right to water. States must, among other things, adopt a national policy on water that: gives priority in water management to essential personal and domestic uses; defines the objectives for the extension of water services, with a focus on disadvantaged and marginalized groups; identifies the resources available to meet these goals; specifies the most cost-effective way of using them; outlines the responsibilities and time frame for implementing the necessary measures; monitors results and outcomes, including ensuring adequate remedies for violations.

States must also, progressively and to the extent allowed by their available resources, extend water and sanitation services to vulnerable and marginalized groups; make water and sanitation services more affordable; ensure that there is appropriate education about the proper use of water and sanitation, protection of water sources and methods to minimize waste.

Obligations: Among the most important core obligations the State is required to guarantee the right to water, it needs to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease; as well as to ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups and to take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation.. To guarantee these, the State should adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole population; which needs to be devised, periodically reviewed based on a participatory and transparent process.

2. Water in Haiti
Haiti failed to reach the Millennium Development Goals for water and sanitation which aimed to reduce the percentage of people accessing to safe drinking water by half by 2015. This meant that access to water should have been greater than 76%, and access to improved sanitation greater than 85% (World Bank, 2007:11). However, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, Haiti performance was lagging as of 2015. In urban areas, less than 1 million people had access to pipe water, while almost 2 million had access to unimproved sources; and more than 3 million persons had access to unimproved sanitation.

Figure 1. Access to water (World Bank. (2017)

Figure 2. Access to Sanitation (World Bank. (2017).

Goal 6 of the Sustainable Development Goals aims to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all by 2030. Yet, Haiti is unlikely to meet these goals, and data collected for many indicators can prove it. For instance, the proportion of people practicing open defecation was still 19% in 2015 (Figure 3), and the proportion of people using hand washing facilities on premises was less than 30% in 2015 (Figure 4).

Figure 3. Proportion of People Practicing Open Defecation (unstats.un.org).

 Figure 4. Proportion of population with basic handwashing facilities on premises (unstats.un.org).

2.2. Haiti’s known violations of Right to Water and Sanitation

Sufficiency: Water must be continuous and sufficient with an average consumption ranged between 50 to 100 liters according to WHO.

Violation: Water supply is not continued in Haiti. In some area, water supply is less than 20 hours a week.

Safety: Water must be free from micro-organisms or other substances that are a threat to health.

Violation: Cholera, a waterborne disease, has killed over 9200 Haitians and afflicted over 770,000 (National Geographic).

Acceptability: Definition: Color, taste, odor of water should be acceptable.

Violation: Water treatment facilities are not yet widespread in Haiti. 32% of households drink untreated water (VisiEau 2018).

Accessibility: WHO states that water has to be accessible within 1000 meters and 30 minutes.

Violation: Only 31% of the population have access to improved sanitation facilities while 64% have access to drinking water sources (VisiEau 2018).

Affordability: Cost of water should not exceed 5% of household income.

Violation: Fecal waste removal is unaffordable for the poorest Haitians (World Bank 2017).  Water truck in Port-au-Prince cost over $ 20 us, which is too expensive for many.

3. The Spiral Model as a Framework to Explain Change
The Spiral Model seeks to explain the five phases a State may progress through, as it brings about domestic human rights improvements in response to pressures from a network of domestic and international actors. In each of these phases, the model highlights how a network of domestic and international human rights NGOs, UN bodies and states promoting international human rights norms, can influence the human rights practices at a domestic level.

In an attempt to identify how, where and why international human rights norms matter to states, the Spiral Model depicts “several boomerang throws, with diverging effects on the human rights situation in the target country (and) disconfirms the notion that certain types of political, economic, or social systems cannot be subjected to change and that international human rights are fundamentally alien to particular cultures or regions of the world” (Risse, et al., 2013: 239).

The model uses 4 elements to explain the 5 stages (repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, rule consistent behavior) of domestic Human Rights and the process of change from one stage to the next: scope conditions, changing scope conditions and “world time”, actors, and causal mechanisms.

Scope conditions refer to the different types of conditions in a country that affect the ease of compliance or the Human Right socialization. The first condition the model analysis is the regime type which indicates the mobilization potential or mobilization inhibitors the country presents. On the other hand, State Consolidation specifies the institutional capacity to comply with the entitlements to respect, protect, and fulfill a right. Likewise, the State control over the violations is indicated by the centralization of rule implementation for a Human Right issue. Finally, the last scope conditions considered by the model are material vulnerability which explains the control over resources, and social vulnerability, which explains the international or domestic reputation of the country’s compliance with the Human Right.

Domestic scope conditions may change over time affecting process of Human Rights change, and societal “openness” to socialization processes may vary in different historical periods. In other words, changes in conditions are affected by “world time”, which may speed or slow the process depending on the context and issue, changing robustness of the international Human Rights regime and transnational advocacy networks (TANs) over time.

Along with the scope conditions and changing conditions over time, the model places especial emphasis on 3 levels of actors involved in the changing process from one stage to the other. In this sense, usually one set of actors dominates each stage, being stronger and possibly able to drive the process forward. The violator State is the first level defined by the model and it includes violations via commission, complicity, and omission. Where State vulnerability is linked to scope conditions, and to domestic and international actor strength. The second level is composed by domestic opposition to the Human Right violation, required to endure change, because the stronger the domestic opposition, the more vulnerable the violator government to internal pressures, even without TANs. Finally, the third level of actors, corresponds to international supporters, who are often “the single most important cause of change toward initial concessions”.

For actors to drive the process of change from one stage to the other, they may use a variety of different “modes of social action,” aligned with 4 different causal mechanisms: coercion, incentives, persuasion, capacity building. Coercion, under a hierarchical authority is characterized by the use of force and legal enforcement to induce compliance. Under a logic of consequences, incetinves can be either sanctions or rewards. On the other hand, persuasion is characterized by a discursive power mainly manifested by arguing, naming and/or shaming through a logic of arguing or apporpaiatenes. Finally, to create the preconditions so that logic of consequences or of approprateness can apply, capacity building is funamental, and is mainly represented by institution building, education and training.

4. Spiral Model as Framework to analysis the Right to Water in Haiti
Using the Spiral Model and the key elements of the framework, the following section presents the analysis of the Right to Water in Haiti, since the country’s independence in 1804 to the present day. Based on historical facts and substantial evidence, the analysis presents a comprehensive attempt to address the failure to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to water in Haiti and aims to explain the process of change of the Right of Water from the first stage of Repression to the fourth stage of Prescriptive Status, where the right is now. By assessing the outcomes of each stage, a set of recommendations for Haiti are presented, to push the process forward and advance to the final stage of the Model: Rule-Consistent Behavior.

Continual requirements to pay its debilitating debt, which date back to its early days of independence, when Haiti was essentially forced to purchase its freedom from the French for an exorbitant sum, and which has further amassed during two centuries of political turmoil, foreign occupation, and corruption, have left the Haitian government unable to funnel its limited resources into social infrastructure programs like water and sanitation systems, with catastrophic effects on the health and well-being of the Haitian people.

The lack of clean water ranks high among the most serious of Haiti’s many serious human rights challenges. In 2002, Haiti ranked 101 out of 127 countries according to indicators such as quantity and quality of fresh water; the existence of wastewater treatment facilities; and the presence of legal structures, such as polluting regimes. Problems with Haiti’s water system did not develop in isolation, as the analysis shows, historical legacies and persistent extreme poverty have affected the ability of the government to deliver clean water to its people. The effects of this serious deprivation. reverberate beyond the basic capacity to drink or bathe; the scarcity of clean water impacts different aspects of daily life. Weakened by political violence, interference from external parties, institutional weaknesses and a long history of crushing debts, the Haitian government has been unable to provide reliable water to its urban population or their rural communities. This failure continues to fuel a vicious circle of contaminated water, weak public hygiene, poor health and chronic poverty.

Figure 5. Spiral Model as Framework to analysis the Right to Water in Haiti

4.1. Stage 1: Repression
The Spiral Model states that there is Repression for a Human Right when there is little to no engagement in discussion of wrong-doing by the State regarding the violations of the right, and domestic opposition is too oppressed to present a significant challenge. Based on this definition of Repression, Haiti was in the stage of repression for the Right to Water ever since its independence in 1804 until 1900. Due to the political turmoil, the weak consolidation of the state, the social and economic vulnerabilities that the country was experiencing due to the new-found independence, during this period the wrong-doing regarding water and sanitation was not a preoccupation for the State or the other actors involved.

Since the revolution started in 1791, the slaves destroyed most of the colonial infrastructure to make its recolonization difficult (Diamond, 2005: 335). Food supplies, clean water, and sanitation facilities were mostly extinguished (Varma et al., 2008:5). While it was a very strategic approach, it reduced the population’s access to water and sanitation considerably. But that was not the greatest challenge. Only 25 years after the independence, in 1825, Haiti was coerced by France to pay an independence debt as compensation for the damage during the revolution. The amount payed to France, is equivalent to $21 billion US dollars in current currency.  Thus, improving the access to water and improving sanitation was impossible. To aggravate the situation, the US and France put an embargo on Haiti, and refused to acknowledge its independence. “Independence is the worst and most dangerous condition they can be in for the United States” said the American President John Adams in 1799 (Pezzullo, 2006:52). Under these conditions, the Haitian society was unable to oppose or pressure the government to resolve the water problem. It was until 1862, that the US finally recognized Haiti’s independence. Even though in 1883, Haiti payed entirely to France the independence debt, it still owed money from loans to French banks. Thus, by the end of the 19^th century, Haiti had international relationship with other countries. But, with international relationship comes also international pressure which pushed Haiti to the next stage of the spiral model in 1900.

4.2. Stage 2: Denial
The stage of Denial is described as when a state refuses to acknowledge its wrong-doing regarding a right violation. From 1900 to 1942 Haiti denied its wrong-doing in the water and sanitation sector. The actors sparkling the shift to Denial was the international society, and the mechanism used was shaming.  During this stage, the civil society remained weak, and the GOH did not undertake any action for improving the conditions.

It started with a dysentery outbreak in Petit-Trou de Nippes in 1900, a disease that caused diarrhea to numerous people in the city. Some public health specialists in mission in Haiti blamed the government by reporting that poverty, bad alimentation, the use of impure water where among the causes of the dysentery epidemic (Behrmann, 1900:498).  But, the Government of Haiti did not take any actions to appease the critics. Instead, it was so corrupted that the country fell into political instabilities with multiple short-term presidencies. From 1902 to 1915, 8 presidents rose and fell, and two of them were severely killed by the population. Thus, the international blame was ignored; the validity of the norm regarding water and sanitation was not a preoccupation. Ultimately, all the political turmoil led to the American Occupation of Haiti in 1915.

During the occupation, the US carried a lot of projects: one thousand miles of road and medical facilities were built; the telephone network was modernized; the first radio station was opened (Abbot, 2011:64); water supply and sanitation projects were also executed (Gelting, 2013:665). This could be interpreted as a shift into the stage of Tactical Concessions, but it was not.  Those sanitations projects were not executed by Haiti itself, and the Tactical Concessions stage, as characterized by the spiral modal, requires the state to take symbolic actions in response to the pressure. Deliberate actions to appease the critics were taken only after the American Occupation, when Elie Lescot came to power. 

4.3. Stage 3: Tactical Concessions
This stage is characterized by state doing symbolic actions, not genuinely, to reduce the pressure received for violating a right. This stage started in Haiti in 1942 and ended in 2009. The actors provoking the shift were the Government of Haiti, and the international society. The mechanism used was mostly incentives: the US, the IDB, the IMF gave Haiti a lot of loan in this period.

The first signs of tactical concessions were when President Elie Lescot requested $ 350,000 US dollars for sanitation projects (Department of State, 1945); after that, in 1948, President Estimé solicited a group of experts from the United Nation to investigate the cause of water problems. Later in 1957, with Duvalier’s dictatorship, Haiti plunged into doing concessions merely to receive foreign aid. In 1964, Duvalier created the Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d’Eau Potable (CAMEP), an institution managing the water supply in the metropolitan area; in 1977, the Service National d’Eau Potable was created to provide water outside the capital. As a result, these attracted a lot of foreign aid. Haiti received $4.3 million in 1971, $9.3 million in 1974, and $35.5 million in 1975 from the US (Pezzullo, 2006:108). By 1986, Haiti was among the top 3 regional recipients of loans from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) for water supply and sewerage (Gelting, 2013:666).

Unfortunately, Duvalier did not endeavor to put Haiti toward a more sustainable path regarding water and sanitation. Instead, the aid money was generally embezzled by the officials. In 1975 for instance, a project aiming to build 500 public latrines in Port-au-Prince was not executed because the aid money was siphoned off while millions of Haitians were living without latrine (Abbot, 2011:182). In addition, when Haiti was granted $22 million in 1980 by the IMF, Duvalier embezzled $16 million for his personal use while $4 million went in the hands of his corrupted militia (Ferguson, 1988:70). If Duvalier’s concessions were genuine, he could have reformed and regulated the water and sanitation sector in Haiti because his regime had absolute power. After Duvalier’s downfall in 1986, political instabilities made it hard to shift to the stage of Prescriptive Status; government after government Haiti continued with the tactical concessions. In 1996, with the support of the IDB, the Ministry of Transportation and Public Work (MTPTC) created the unit URSEP aiming to reform the water sector (US Army Corps of Engineers, 1999:5).

Meanwhile, the civil society gained strength. By the 2000s, numerous NGOs started working in the sector which enabled Haiti to move in the next level. The laws reforming the water and sanitation sector was drafted in 2006. It was then voted unanimously in the Haitian Parliament and was published on March 25^th in 2009.  Haiti thus shifted from Tactical Concessions to Prescriptive Status.

4.4. Stage 4: Prescriptive Status
This stage is characterized by a genuine commitment of the state to respect a given right. Unlike the third stage, the actions undertaken in Prescriptive Status are not merely symbolic, but the state is genuinely committed to reduce the right violations. Since 2009, Haiti’s water and sanitation sector is in this stage. The reform of the water and sanitation sector created the “Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement (DINEPA)”, an institution aiming to develop the sector, to regulate it and to monitor the actors. This was a genuine commitment: It is the first time the water sector has been explicitly regulated. Before, the right to water was just defined implicitly in the Constitution (Varma et al., 2008:41).

The actors triggering this turn were the civil society, which strengthened during the third stage, in conjunction with international donors that focused on capacity building through education. For instance, Haiti Outreach focuses on increasing access to clean water, and hygiene education; Hope for Haiti has had a program of installing water purification systems and hygiene education since 2007; Haiti Water has had a program providing safe water in the West department since 2005. A consortium of NGOs, called the “Plateforme des ONGs en Eau Potable et Assainissement (PEPA)”, was created. Both international and domestic NGOs comprise PEPA. Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies and engineers allied with some NGOs to produce chemical treatment for water (Varma et al., 2008:17). That’s how the civil society strengthened. In parallel, international actors continued to support. For the first 3 years of DINEPA operation for instance, Haiti received $300 million from IDB and the Spanish Agency (Varma et al., 2008:17). Without that, the transition to the fourth stage might have been very unlikely.

With this effort comes also positive results. From 2000 to 2015 the proportion of people practicing open defecation decreased from 38% to 19% (SDG Indicators Global Database, 2017); access to water and sanitation has increased at a higher rate in urban areas (World Bank, 2017:12). However, this did not prevent Haiti to score only 61.4 out of 100 for the 6^th goal of the SDGs in 2018. Therefore, the transition to the stage of Rule Consistent Behavior is not yet forthcoming.

4.5. Stage 5: Rule Consistent Behavior
This stage requires the state to consistently prevent or respond to violations systematically. The compliance to the right should not merely be prescribed in the laws, but it must be reflected in the society’s behavior. Unfortunately, the enjoyment of the right to water and sanitation in Haiti is not consistent to this day, there have still been various violations. For instance, less than 30% of the population still don’t have access basic hand washing facilities (SDG Indicators Global Database, 2017); only 54.1% of the population had access to improved sources of water within 30 minutes in 2012 (World Bank, 2017:17).

International and domestic actors are continuing their advocacy in the water and sanitation sector. However, many events counterbalanced those efforts. Yet, 8 months after the creation of DINEPA, an earthquake severely struck Haiti in 2010 causing more than 300,000 casualties (Figaro, 2011:27). This changed DINEPA’s focus from long-term goals to emergency. DINEPA helped in providing water to more than 1 million of displaced persons, and close to $100 million U.S. dollars evaporated in water, sanitation and hygiene (Gelting, 2013: 667). The same year, in October 2010, the cholera epidemic started. More than 6,900 people died while 500,000 caught the disease (Figaro, 2011:27). By 2012, $50 million U.S. dollar was already spent in response to the cholera outbreak. Haiti faces many other challenges such recurrent hurricanes, economic problems, political instabilities, and corruption which prevent it to move to the fifth stage.

5. Recommendations
As the analysis of each stage has shown, while the Government of Haiti is primarily responsible for ensuring the Right to Water, other key actors, such as international financial institutions, foreign States, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies, also have a role in solving Haiti’s water crisis. In addition to a diverse set of scope conditions and root causes that along with a weak state consolidation, a poor economy and chronic and persistent inequality and poverty are undermining the full compliance of the Right to Water in Haiti. In this sense, to ensure a sustainable solution, and the change from Prescriptive Status to Rule-Consistent Behavior, we recommend a comprehensive rights-based approach to the development and implementation of water projects.

In other words, we urge the government and all the non-state actors involved, to integrate norms, standards and principles of international human rights law into the plans, policies and processes of development, guaranteeing accountability not only to Haitians but also to the international community. Strengthening local entities, fostering economic growth through capacity building and development of human resources, is also fundamental for Haiti in order to achieve independence from humanitarian and foreign aid. Such an approach would enhance the Haitian government’s ability to deliver these services and the Haitian population’s right to access safe and sufficient water.

To consolidate the Rule-Consistent Behavior, is fundamental to empower people to change their own lives. A participatory approach where population can be routinely consulted on development matter, both in providing input on project design and in ensuring necessary modifications to the projects to maximize the realization of human rights, is fundamental to continue driving the process of change to the next stage. Community members must be involved in all efforts to improve the water situation; snd should be consulted during the development of water projects, especially concerning issues such as location of water sources, availability of water, sanitation precautions, timeframes for implementation, cost of water, and quality of water. This participation would help to ensure that water projects are empowering the Haitian people as rights-holders, and that the projects are adequately and accurately meeting their needs.

On the other hand, transparency of all entities involved in the development and implementation of water projects is essential to guarantee the compliance of the Right to Water, to deter corruption and target the elimination of inequalities on the provision of the right. Planning and institutional coordination for the long-term realization of the rights to water and sanitation is very important as well as publicly available information about water policies and programs, status of project implementation and detail how funds allocated for water sector projects are being spent should be publicly available. In this sense, since the government of Haiti does not yet have the capacity to effectively regulate the private sector, all groups responsible for water distribution or sale should be responsible for checking the safety of sources used for drinking water on a regular basis.

It is not only important to push forward the change into Rule-Consistent Behavior, but also to guarantee sustainability in the long run, to make sure there is no setback in the process. Tackling the underlying causes of the inability of the Haitian government to provide not only water, but basic needs to the people, is fundamental to advance in the process of consistently addressing and preventing violations of the Right to Water, guaranteeing sufficiency, safety, acceptability, accessibility and affordability for all, without discrimination, through participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability.

Bibliography
Abbott, Elizabeth. Haiti: A Shattered Nation. (2011). London; New York; Overlook Duckworth.

Behrmann, T., Paul Salomon, and Lelio Hudicourt. (1900). HAITI. Dysentery Prevalent in Nippes. Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 15, no. 9 (1900): 497-99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41453121.

Department of State. (1945). Agreement between the United States of America and Haiti. https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/ext/dw/101627534/PDF/101627534.pdf

Diamond, Jared M. (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking.

Farmer P, Almazor CP, Bahnsen ET, Barry D, Bazile J, Bloom BR, et al. (2011). Meeting Cholera’s Challenge to Haiti and the World: A Joint Statement on Cholera Prevention and Care. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 5(5): e1145. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0001145

Ferguson, James. (1988). Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier. Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: Basil Blackwell.

Figaro, Joseph. (2011). In need of a better WASH: Water, sanitation, and hygiene policy issues in post-earthquake Haiti, Oxfam. Available: https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/wash-policy-issues-post-earthquake-haiti.pdf

Gelting, Richard et Al. (2013). Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present and Future. The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, Volume 89, Issue 4: 665-670. https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.13-0217

Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti. (2015). Development Cooperation and The Rights to Water and Sanitation in Haiti. Submission to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation.   https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Water/ContributionsDevelopmentCooperation/Institute_for_Justice_and_Democracy_in_Haiti.pdf

Mary C. Smith Fawzi, Mary C. (2013). The Right to Water in Haiti. Harvard Medical School/Partners in Health.   https://globalstudiesoutreach.harvard.edu/files/globalstudiesoutreach/files/fawzi_compressed_harvard_aug72013.pdf

Pezzullo, Ralph. (2006). Plunging into Haiti. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.

Sidder, Aaron. (2016). “How Cholera Spread So Quickly Through Haiti.” National Geographic, August 18. https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/haiti-cholera-crisis-united-nations-admission/

US Army Corps of Engineers. (1999). Water resources Assessment of Haiti. https://www.gvsu.edu/cms4/asset/CE59D505-D565-6FFC-FF0D167C69F76EFC/acoe_water_resources_of_haiti.pdf

UN Statistics Division. “SDG Indicators Global Database.” United Nations. Web. Nov. 2017.

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (November 2002) General Comment No. 15. The right to water. https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/CESCR_GC_15.pdf

Varma M, Satterthwaite M, Klasing A, Shoranik T, Jean J, et al. (2008). Wòch nan soley: the denial of the right to water in Haiti. Francois-Bagnoud Center for Public Health. Available: http://www.pih.org/page/-/reports/Haiti_Report_FINAL.pdf.

Widmer JM, Sergile F, Cheremond Y, Morris JG. 2018. “VisiEAU 2018—a vision for water in Haiti”, 2018. Emerging infectious diseases, Volume 24, No 10. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2410.180693

Webster, Paul Christopher. (2011). Lack of clean water exacerbates cholera outbreak in Haiti. Canadian Medical Association. Journal 183, (2) (Feb 08): E83-4. https://search-proquest-com.pitt.idm.oclc.org/docview/851208500?accountid=14709

World Bank. (2014). Haiti – Rural Water and Sanitation Project (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/812661468033349316/Haiti-Rural-Water-and-Sanitation-Project

World Bank. (2017). Looking Beyond Government-Led Delivery of Water Supply and Sanitation Services (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.   https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28997

Introduction
After ruling for 14 years, Francois Duvalier, the tyrannical dictator of Haiti, was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. The latter continued with the same authoritarian politics, but his regime fell in 1986. Many people argue that this breakdown was due to the US’s lower preoccupation about Communism at the end of the Cold War; thus, the American government forced him to resign by freezing his aid in 1986. This argument cannot solely explain Baby Doc’s downfall. Papa Doc’s aid was also frozen under Kennedy; however, he succeeded in sustaining his regime. How can this difference be explained then? In fact, foreign aid conditionalities played a crucial role in personalist dictatorship survival. When it is contingent on democratization, it provides an incentive for liberalization, which in turn can impede the dictator’s survival. That’s what happened to Baby Doc: Aid was contingent on his domestic policies, which turned out to weaken his repressive capacity. Whereas under Papa Doc, foreign aid conditionality was, to a great extent, an incentive for remaining anti-communist. Thus, he was able to use it to strengthen his coercive apparatus.

Foreign aid can also have different results on autocrats’ legitimacy due to corruption generally associated with it. For charismatic dictators, which gain legitimacy through ideology and personality cult, corruption might have no, or little effect on their reputation. However, for uncharismatic autocrats which seek legitimacy on economic performance, corrupt management of aid might be an impediment. The Duvaliers were no exception to this rule. The popular Papa Doc maintained his legitimacy even though his regime was a kleptocracy. Whereas Baby Doc’s economic failure undermined his.

In sum, Baby Doc had poor legitimacy in addition to his weaker repressive apparatus. The confluence of those two made his personalist dictatorship uncontrollably vulnerable. That’s why the US easily ousted him by cutting his aid in 1986.

Repression under Papa Doc (1957-1971)
Foreign aid, which represented 70% of Haiti’s income[1], had different impact on the Duvaliers’ repressive capacity. Under Papa Doc, the aid was not contingent on democratization. The autocrat received military and financial assistance by simply pretending to be anti-communist. This lack of restrictive conditionalities enabled him to use the assistance for his own interests. He embezzled 80% of it; $10 million was taken from the national treasury per year[2]. He was thus able to strengthen his repressive apparatus by building a large patronage network with his militia also known as the “Tontons Macoutes”. The army, which had previously staged many coups, was counterbalanced by Papa Doc’s militia. By 1971, it represented 5% of the population while the army was only 7000[3]. The “Tontons Macoutes” were spread throughout the entire country and executed whatever Duvalier ordered them, thus enabling him to track dissidents.

Papa Doc killed or repressed his opponents. On November 14^th, 1964, two leaders of the group “Jeune Haiti”, which had attempted to overthrow Duvalier, were executed publicly. It was a strategy to deter any potential rebellion. The press and the clergy were also harassed. The leader of the magazine L’Escale, Yvonne Hakime-Rimpel, was arrested and tortured by the “Tontons Macoutes”; several priests were expelled while many religious institutions were closed[4]. The elite was neither exempt from Papa Doc’s brutality. The former army general, Francois Benoit, was wrongly suspected of masterminding a coup. In response, his entire family was decimated while he escaped through the Dominican embassy. 19 officers were also executed in 1967 after attempting to bomb the National Palace. In total, 30,000 to 60,000 people were killed while many others were forced to exile or brutalized[5]. With all these atrocities, Papa Doc weakened the opposition, which allowed him to establish a robust dictatorship.

When Kennedy froze his aid in 1963, Papa Doc was thus able to come up with new taxes, and to reduce salaries of government officials and the military[6]. This enabled him to find money for his patronage network, thus sustaining his regime. If his foreign aid was contingent upon liberalization, his regime might have had a different fate. He would certainly not have that strong apparatus to usurp money for feeding his patronage network. Thus, he would more likely resign when the aid was cut.

Repression under Baby Doc (1971-1986)
Unlike Papa Doc, Baby Doc’s aid was contingent on democratization. Under Jimmy Carter, human rights became a precondition for the young dictator to receive American aid. Given his regime reliance on it, Baby Doc was forced to move toward liberalization. 104 political prisoners were released in 1977; legislative election was held in 1979; legal sanctions were also taken against Tonton Macoute for abuse[7]; the military academy, which Papa Doc had closed since 1961, was reopened in 1972[8]. Furthermore, the US pushed him to recognize other political parties constitutionally in 1985; the post of prime minister was established; and election was forthcoming in 1987[9]. Thus, Baby Doc’s regime was markedly less repressive than his father’s. These gave Baby Doc a friendlier façade, which attracted a lot of benefits. Foreign aid increased from $4.3 million in 1971, $9.3 million in 1974, to $35.5 million in 1975; thousands of exiles headed back to Haiti; 167,260 tourists visited the country by 1977[10]; Haiti’s relationship with the Vatican was also restored in 1983, which was honored by a papal visit.

However, those steps toward liberalization weakened the young tyrant’s apparatus. Radio stations and newspaper began to criticize the regime[11]; his control over the military was lost[12]; the speech of the pope, which indirectly rebuked the government, sparked political protests[13]. By the end of 1985, mass uprisings for Baby Doc’s departure started. At this stage, the regime was unable to use repression to control the mass. One his last resorts was the American aid, which he could use as incentive to decrease the tension. But, the situation was exacerbated because the US cut the aid in 1986. Baby Doc had thus any other choices than to resign.

In sum, foreign aid, due to its conditionalities, rendered Baby Doc’s regime weak. If the conditions were not so restrictive, he would be able to keep the level of repression as it was under his father. He would then be able to raise taxes and find money for continuously feeding his corrupted regime.

Papa Doc’s Legitimacy
Papa Doc was a charismatic leader who did not based his legitimacy on economic performance. He gained it through his strong ideology and personality cult. The name Papa Doc by itself is a term of appreciation which he obtained after he wiped out yaws with penicillin. Furthermore, his ideology of “noirisme”, whereby he promoted the reaffirmation of black pride, enabled him to gain the appreciation of the black majority. He also built his personality cult by claiming to be the incarnation of “Baron Samedi”, which is known as the guardian of the graveyard in Haitian voodoo. These gave him a supernatural image.

In spite of his mismanagement of aid, which contributed to Haiti’s economic failure, Papa Doc maintained his legitimacy. When Kennedy was pressurizing him, he was able to mobilize people for him, which deterred the US from invading Haiti[14].  If Papa Doc did not have this strong legitimacy, his economic failure might have had more impact on his reputation. Thus, his regime would have become vulnerable after Kennedy froze the aid.

Baby Doc’s Legitimacy
Unlike his father, Baby Doc was not charismatic. His legitimacy was a matter of economic performance. “My father did the political revolution, I will do the economic revolution”, said Baby Doc. His effort toward political liberalization attracted more aid and many American corporations. 70,000 Haitians were employed in 240 offshore factories by 1985[15]. However, Baby Doc’s kleptocracy counterweighted those achievements, thus preventing him from having a good reputation. In 1980, he married Michèle Bennett in a lavish wedding which costed 3 to 7 million USD[16]. Later that year, Haiti was granted $22 million from the IMF, but $16 million went for Duvalier personal use while $4 million was at the disposition of the “Tontons Macoutes”[17]. By 1983, 44% of Haiti’s income was earned by 1% of the population, and the average income per capita was $200 per year (World Bank). Baby Doc’s economic failure was obvious. The IMF even reported that Haiti’s economical crisis is due to excessive undeclared spending.

Thus, the uncharismatic Baby Doc remained with his weak legitimacy. His corrupt management of the aid prevented Haiti from growing economically, which exacerbated his regime vulnerability. If he had stronger legitimacy, cutting his aid would have had less impact on his survival. He might have had mass mobilization for him like his father did 1963, which could lead to the restoration of the aid.

Conclusion
Foreign aid plays a significant role in autocrats’ survival by influencing their repressive capacity and legitimacy. When the aid is not contingent upon liberalization, charismatic autocrats with ideological legitimacy can use it to strengthen their apparatus. That’s why Papa Doc maintained his regime until he died. The lack of restrictive conditionalities enabled him to use the aid for patronizing his militia, thus consolidating his ruthless dictatorship. At this stage he became terribly resistant. Added to his strong apparatus, his strong personality cult allowed him to resist when Kennedy cut his aid in 1963. He had mass mobilization for him, which deterred the US from invading Haiti. The confluence of his strong repressive capacity and strong legitimacy made it hard to oust him.

On the other hand, when aid is contingent upon liberalization, it can easily weaken uncharismatic autocrats. First, liberalization counterweighs their repressive ability. Second, corruption associated with aid may lead to economic failure, which in turn can prevent them from earning legitimacy on economic performance. That’s why Baby Doc was so vulnerable. The US pressured him to liberalize his regime: A lot of political prisoners were released; the press was allowed to criticize; sanctions were taken against abuse of the “Tontons Macoutes”; and the army regained its strength. All these contributed to weaken Baby Doc’s repressiveness. Furthermore, corrupt management of foreign aid led to economic failure, which tarnished his reputation. The annual income per capita was $200; the IMF even reported that the regime’s undeclared spending was the major cause of the economic crisis. Baby Doc had thus a weak legitimacy in addition to his weak repressive apparatus. The confluence of those two was incompatible with a personalist dictatorship type. That’s why the young autocrat resigned in 1986.

In conclusion, when aid is not contingent on liberalization, it consolidates autocracies that already had strong personality cult. Whereas, aid which is contingent on democratization has great chance to breakdown autocracies with weak legitimacy.

Works Cited
Ferguson, James. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier. Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

Hebert, Gold. “The downfall of furniture-face Haiti: the Duvalier and their legacy.” Los Angeles Time, October 16, 1988.

Pezzullo, Ralph. Plunging into Haiti. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006.

Snyder, Richard. “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 379-99, https://www-jstor-org.pitt.idm.oclc.org/stable/422151

Wien Weibert Arthus. “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War: Kennedy Facing the Duvalier Dilemma” Diplomatic History, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 2015: 504–531, https://doi-org.pitt.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/dh/dhu001

Footnote
[1] Gold Hebert, “The downfall of furniture-face Haiti: the Duvalier and their legacy,” Los Angeles Time, October 16, 1988.

[2] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 58

[3] Richard Snyder. “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 388.

[4] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 50.

[5] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 57.

[6] Wien Weibert Arthus. “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War: Kennedy Facing the Duvalier Dilemma”, Diplomatic History, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 2015: page 522,

[7] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 67.

[8] Ralph Pezzullo. Plunging into Haiti (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 108.

[9] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 83

[10] Ralph Pezzullo. Plunging into Haiti (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 108.

[11] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 68.

[12] Richard Snyder. “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 389.

[13] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 76.

[14] Wien Weibert Arthus. “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War: Kennedy Facing the Duvalier Dilemma”, Diplomatic History, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 2015: page 526

[15] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 82.

[16] Ralph Pezzullo. Plunging into Haiti (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 110.

[17] James Ferguson. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvalier (Oxford; New-York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 70.

Introduction
John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1917-1963), the 35^th president of the United States, was an influential figure during the Cold War. Prior to his political career, he joined the US Navy in 1941 during World War II. This experience nearly became a tragedy when the Japanese attacked the PT boat he was commanding in the South-Pacific. The boat was destroyed, but Kennedy swam intermittently for 11 hours with a wounded soldier on his back to reach a nearby island[1]. What was about to become a tragedy turned out to be an epic struggle for survival which led Kennedy to win the award of “US Navy and Marine Corps Medal” for heroism. Subsequently, he left the US Navy to become a congressman in 1946; he served three terms consecutively in the House of Representatives. After that, Kennedy left the Congress to run for the Senate in 1952; he won against the incumbent Henry Cabot Lodge. As his popularity continued to grow, he decided to run for president in January 1960. He defeated the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, and began his term in January 1961 in a very fragile context: Communism was already established in Cuba and the fear of its spread was at its climax. Kennedy then pledged to stop this pervasive system at any cost during his inauguration[2].

After the establishment of Communism in Cuba, Latin America was among the most vulnerable regions threatened by it. Kennedy’s approach was then to overthrow Fidel Castro by covert operations, and to provide support to the other countries so that they become less vulnerable to communism. What might seem to be a straightforward approach turned out to be very challenging to Kennedy. The Caribbean Basin constituted a particular hardship to Kennedy due to its 3 different predispositions: Cuba was communist, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were in a middle course, and the other countries were staunch allies of the US[3]. Nevertheless, during his short presidency, Kennedy played a significant role in preventing the communism spread by making concessions in his policies.

Alliance for Progress
The economy of Latin America was generally weak, which made it vulnerable to foreign interference. In response to that, Kennedy proposed in 1961 the Agency for International Development and the Alliance for Progress, which was also called: “Marshall Plan for Latin America”. It aimed to modernize Latin American countries while promoting social justice, and democracy by providing a $20 billion loan in a period of 10 years[4]. More than $ 1 billion was already spent during the first year of the program[5]; schools, airports, and hospitals were built in many countries[6].

However, the Alliance was generally considered as a failure. The economic growth of Latin American countries did not exceed 2%[7]; many countries remained authoritarian, and repression continued; the number of unemployed people increased from 18 million to 25 million[8]. Furthermore, the population growth in Latin America increased steeply in the 1960s. In Brazil, the population increased by 25 million people, in Columbia by more than 15.6 million people, in the continent generally by an annual growth of 2.9% [9]. The Alliance was a failure to Kennedy, and it was ultimately abandoned in 1973.

Even though the Alliance for Progress failed its main missions, it helped in preventing the spread of Communism in Latin America, which was one Kennedy’s interests. Without this program, many countries in Latin American would have solicited the support of the Soviet Union which could in turn lead the Communism establishment there. From this perspective, the Alliance for Progress could be seen as a success for Kennedy.

Kennedy Vs Castro
After the Cuban Revolution, the relationship between Cuba and the US deteriorated. In 1961, Eisenhower ended the US diplomatic relationship with Cuba. He then started a plan to overthrow Castro: the “Bay of Pigs” invasion, which Kennedy inherited, and authorized when he came in power. 1400 Cuban exiles were sent to  the Bay of Pigs to overthrow Castro and to dismantle the established Communism there. However, this mission did not take long to turn into a fiasco. Only 4 days after the invasion started, on April 19^th, 1961, the invaders were defeated by the Cuban army; 1100 men among them were captured and imprisoned[10]; they spent 20 months in captivity. Finally, they were released when the US agreed to provide food and medical support worth $53 million as compensation to Cuba.

After the Bay of Pigs disaster, Castro wanted to strengthen his ties with the Soviet Union[11]. Nevertheless, Kennedy was not deterred from plotting other coups against him. In November 1961, Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose, a covert operation consisting of multiple plots to undermine Castro. Among those plots were industrial sabotage, crops burning, worsening Cubans’ condition of living[12]. Unfortunately, none of these plots succeeded; Mongoose was a failure which harmed the reputation of the CIA[13]. Eventually, after the Cuban Missile crisis, Kennedy abandoned the Operation Mongoose.

On October 16^th in 1962, Kennedy was informed of the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba placed by the Soviet Union. This constituted a massive threat to the US, but Kennedy handled it successfully. The first strategy Kennedy adopted was to put Cuba in quarantine[14] by encircling it with American ships. This was to prevent the transportation of other missiles from the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Kennedy negotiated with the Soviet Union to remove its missiles in exchange to not invade Cuba, and to remove the American Missiles in Turkey[15]. As a result, the crisis was solved.

In sum, Kennedy failed his mission to dismantle communism in Cuba, and to oust Castro. The Bay of Pigs invasion turned into a fiasco, and the Operation Mongoose failed too. However, the concession he made in his policies helped in avoiding a war with Cuba. First, by agreeing to provide food and medicine $53 million worth in exchange for the prisoners from the Bay of Pigs tragedy, he reduced the tension between the US and Cuba. Second, by accepting to remove American missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet Union to remove its missiles in Cuba, he calmed the situation down with the Soviet Union, which helped avoiding a third World War.

Kennedy Vs Trujillo
Kennedy, in addition to the Bays of Pigs invasion to Cuba, inherited from Eisenhower the covert operation to oust the ruthless dictator Raphael Trujillo of Dominican Republic. Eisenhower approved the plot after Trujillo attempted to kill the Venezuelan president Betancourt in 1960. Shortly after, during Kennedy’s presidency, the CIA helped in executing the plan. Between March 31^st, and April 19^th in 1961, several M3 machine guns were sent to the dissidents of Trujillo[16]. However, Kennedy did not agree to kill Trujillo; he sent a cable to Henry Dearborn, a diplomat official, where he mentioned that the US will not endorse Trujillo’s death. Nevertheless, Trujillo was cut down in cold blood in May 1961 while he was heading to his mistress house[17].

Even though Kennedy opposed the assassination of Trujillo, he did not cancel the covert operation aiming to overthrow him because Trujillo was considered like a threat. After Eisenhower cut the diplomatic tie with Trujillo in 1961, Trujillo might have sought for the Soviet Union to support his regime. That’s why the fall of Trujillo, which sparked the democratization of this country, was a success for Kennedy. Trujillo’s survival might have led to the establishment of communism in the Dominican Republic.

Kennedy Vs Papa Doc
Unlike Trujillo’s case, Kennedy did not inherit any plot From Eisenhower to overthrow Francois Duvalier, the tyrant of Haiti. However, he strove to undermine his power. Under Eisenhower, Haiti was spoiled by US’s aid because Duvalier pretended to be a staunch anti-communist. However, Kennedy, unwilling to support dictatorships, reduced the aid given to Haiti (from $7 million to $2.4 million yearly) in October 1961[18]. It was a strategy that could potentially lead to Duvalier’s fall. But, because Papa Doc needed the aid to strengthen his power, he was about to do anything to get the US’s aid back.

During the conference in Uruguay “la Punta Del Este”, Duvalier retaliated. Twenty-one countries participated in the conference which aimed to take some sanctions against Cuba. The US needed 14 out of 21 votes to expel Cuba from the Organization of American State (OAS); 7 of them were not expected to vote against Cuba. Duvalier realized that his vote was decisive; he then negotiated it with the US. As part of the negotiation, the US’s aid was resumed[19]. However, Kennedy did not stop perturbing Duvalier. Since Cuba was put in quarantine, and Trujillo dead, Kennedy started to see Duvalier as a threat to the Caribbean; thus, he wanted to oust him.

 At the end of 1962, Kennedy decided that the USAID will manage the aid from the US instead of the Haitian government[20]. This was detrimental to Duvalier as he needed money to distribute rents to his corrupted “Tonton Macoute”. Furthermore, Kennedy reduced the aid given to Haiti again, and promised to resume it only if Papa Doc dissolved his militia[21]. But Duvalier was very resistant; he came up with new taxes and reduced salaries of the military and government officials to find money to support his regime. Eventually, when Kennedy was assassinated in 1963,  the pressure was taken off Papa Doc; he proclaimed himself president for life the following year.

Thus, Kennedy failed his mission to overthrow Papa Doc. However, he succeeded in preventing communism in Haiti. Even though Kennedy wanted to undermine Duvalier, he did not entirely cut the aid given to Haiti. Cutting the aid completely may have provoked a turnaround from Duvalier which could result to the establishment of Communism in Haiti. Moreover, negotiating with Haiti to vote against Cuba at La Punta Del Este conference was necessary to expel Cuba from the OAS, which in turn deter other countries from embracing Communism. This was a clever decision of Kennedy in preventing the Communism spread.

Kennedy’s assassination
On November 22^nd, 1963, while riding in a motorcade in Dallas, Kennedy was hit by 2 bullets: one in the neck, the other in the head[22]. He was rushed to the Parkland Memorial Hospital, but he was pronounced dead shortly after. There are two main theories about Kennedy’s assassination. The first is that Lee Harvey Oswald, an American communist who had lived in Moscow for a while, was accused of being the assassin with no accomplice. The other theory links the death of Kennedy to a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union and Cuba[23]. In sum, both theories link the assassination as the consequence of fight between communism and anti-communism. This proved that Kennedy was an obstacle for the communists willing to spread their ideology.

Conclusion
Kennedy was an influential figure during the Cold War who played a significant role in fighting Communism in the Caribbean. His missions were to dismantle Communism in Cuba by overthrowing Castro, and to prevent its spread in other countries by strengthening their economies with US aid. Kennedy failed his mission to overthrow Castro. The Bay of Pigs invasion which aimed to invade Cuba by 1400 Cuban exiles turned into a disaster; Operation Mongoose aiming to plan multiple covert operations to undermine Castro’s regime failed too. However, Kennedy made a lot of compromises which help preventing a war with the communists. In fact, during the Cuban missiles crisis, he accepted to remove American missiles, and to not invade Cuba in exchange for the Soviet Union to disarm Cuba. Furthermore, Kennedy failed his mission about the Alliance for Progress which aim to modernize Latin America. Although some infrastructures were built in the region, the overall economic growth of 2% was unimpressive. However, Kennedy succeeded his mission to overthrow Trujillo, the dictator of Dominican Republic. This was a great achievement because Trujillo could have become another Castro, and his fall sparked the democratization of the country. About Haiti, Kennedy failed to overthrow Duvalier, but succeeded in keeping it anti-communist. Even though he was trying to undermine Papa Doc by reducing his foreign aid, he never cancels it completely. Doing so could result in a turnaround of Duvalier which could lead to the communism establishment in this island nation. In sum, Kennedy failed his mission to democratize all the countries in the Caribbean, but he succeeded in preventing the spread of Communism there because of all the concessions he made. Making concession was the best approach to manage the situation, and to avoid a war. An intransigent president might have provoked Cuba and the Soviet Union which could lead to a nuclear war. That’s why Kennedy’s presidency was beneficial to the world.

 Work cited

• Alliance for Progress, Encyclopedia Britannica.
• Alliance for Progress, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library.
• Alliance for Progress, Latin American History, Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
• Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Encyclopedia Britannica.
• “Bay of Pigs Invasion”, Encyclopedia Britannica.
• Cuban Missile Crisis, Encyclopedia Britannica.
• Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library.
• John F. Kennedy, Encyclopedia Britannica.
• The Assassination of Rafael Trujillo, Warfare History Network, 2016
• The Brilliant Disaster, Jim Rasenberger, (chapter 25)
• “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War: Kennedy Facing Duvalier Dilemma”, Wien Weibert Arthus, Journal Article: Diplomatic History. February 27, 2014
• The Cold War, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

 

[1] JFK and the unspeakable, James W. Douglas (p. 3)

[2] The Cold War, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

[3] The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War (p.1)

[4] Alliance for Progress, Encyclopedia Britannica

[5] Alliance for Progress, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

[6] Alliance for Progress, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

[7] Alliance for Progress, Latin American History, Oxford Research Encyclopedias

[8] Alliance for Progress, Latin American History, Oxford Research Encyclopedias

 [9] Alliance for Progress, Latin American History, Oxford Research Encyclopedias

[10] Bay of Pigs Invasion, Encyclopedia Britannica.

[11] The Bay of Pigs Invasion and its aftermath, Office of the historian, Department of state.

[12] The brilliant disaster, Jim Rasenberger (chapter 25)

[13] The brilliant disaster, Jim Rasenberger (chapter 25)

[14] Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

[15] Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy, Presidential Library

[16] The Assassination of Rafael Trujillo, Warfare History Network

[17] The Assassination of Rafael Trujillo, Warfare History Network

[18] The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War (p. 522)

[19] The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War (p. 511)

[20] The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War (p. 517)

[21] The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War (p. 518)

[22] John F. Kennedy, Encyclopedia Britannica

[23] Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Encyclopedia Britannica

To: President Jean-Claude Duvalier
From: MarcoPolo
Subject: Policy options for stopping Haitians migration to the US
Date: January 1st , 1980

Summary
To stop the Haitians migration to the US, you must not try to alleviate poverty with foreign aid, nor deter them from living the country. You rather replace the Volunteers for National Security (VNS) and the army by the National Police of Haiti-a body of civilians with no affiliation with your regime.

Background
(1) Haitians started to migrate massively to the US during Papa Doc’s regime. At first, the migrants were intellectuals and educated people from the bourgeoisie. Upon arrival, the US welcomed them and approved their political asylum demand easily because they were sufficiently skilled to accommodate in the new environment. However, in 1971, the citizens from the lower class started to migrate to the US too. In contrast with the first waves, they are fleeing not only political oppression, but also extreme poverty. From 1971 to 1977, up to 70,000 Haitians migrated to Florida on sailboats. Now, this constitutes an issue for the US, because these migrants are low-skilled, uneducated, Creole speaker; thus, hardly capable of adjusting to the US environment. Prior to this overwhelming migration wave, the US was only preoccupied about whether your regime is pro-communism or against it. But now, as Haitian migrants constitute a burden to them, they are also preoccupied about your domestic policies.

(2) From the US’s perspective, its relationship with Haiti is a dilemma: it supports your regime to fight against communism while it is against your domestic policies.  One of the most efficient way to cope with that is to dismantle your regime which can be done easily by cutting your foreign aid. Given that the strength of your regime depends on their assistance, you won’t have any other choice than to resign if they cut it. Therefore, you must urgently take a decision; otherwise, your regime will perish.

Policy Option 1: Poverty Alleviation
(3) The GOH is receiving substantial assistance from the US, but the poorest people don’t benefit from it. Fraud and embezzlement by the “Tontons Maccoutes” have prevented it from reaching them. Thus, this option calls to use the foreign aid to finance some poverty alleviation projects. First, the GOH should conduct a census to assess the poverty incidence – the total number of people living below the international poverty threshold; then, the aid can be used to provide free food, clean water, medical assistance to people below the threshold. By doing this, their condition will improve; consequently, they will less likely leave the country.

1. Pros: poverty alleviation; fairer use of the foreign aid.
2. Cons: corruption risk in undertaking the project; expensiveness of the project; unreliability and unsustainability of functioning with foreign aid.

Policy Option 2: Deter Haitians from migrating
(4) This option calls to sign a migration treaty with the US government to give it permission to deport Haitians easily upon arrival. If they cannot prove to have political ties, they should not be allowed to apply for political asylum nor to obtain a refugee status. Instead, they must be seen as mere opportunists and then be deported right away. As part of the treaty, you could also ask for assistance to improve the Haitian Coast Guard so that it can prevent sailboats from departing toward Florida.

1. Pros: Drastic reduction in the number of Haitian refugees migrating to the US; better diplomatic relationship with the US as it will perceive you as more conciliatory in cooperating; increase of foreign assistance.
2. Cons: Discrimination against Haitians comparing to Cubans which are welcomed to the US; more frustration and tension within Haiti because the people willing to escape won’t have any other way out; possible violent uprising against your regime as frustration will increase.

Policy Option 3: Create the National Police of Haiti
(5) This option calls to dissolve the army and the Volunteering for National Security(VNS) program known as the “Tonton Macoute”. Guaranteeing security should be the duty of a National Police of Haiti which can be created easily with the same members of VNS. The only difference is that they will be mere civilians with no affiliation with your regime. Subsequently, instead of receiving military assistance from the US, you will ask for police training assistance.

1. Pros: Tackles the deep cause of the migration which is oppression caused by the regime; Increases trust of the international community in your regime which can lead to more foreign assistance; reduces human right violations and repression which will lead to decrease migration; reduction of violent uprising risk; reduces embezzlement and corruption; creates jobs.
2. Cons: Higher cost because the policemen must be paid by the state unlike the volunteers (Tontons Macoutes); not straightforward.

Recommendation
(6) I recommend you the third option which aims to create the National Police of Haiti. The first two options seem to be efficient in solving the migration issue, but they are not. It would be shortsighted to try to alleviate poverty with foreign aid since corruption by the “Tontons Macoutes” is ubiquitous. You might also be tempted to deter Haitians from migrating by signing treaties with the US to facilitate their deportation. But, this would be dangerous to your regime as Haitians will be keener to overthrow it. The most delicate solution is to replace the “Tontons Macoutes” and the army by a National Police of Haiti composed of civilians with no affiliation to your regime. It is seemingly irrelevant to the migration issue, but it is a subtle and clever way to stop it. In fact, the deep cause of the migration is the repression caused by your regime. Once the VNS is dissolved and oppression stopped, Haitians will have more political freedoms to participate in their country’s construction. Therefore, they won’t have any reason to risk their lives in unworthy sailboats migrating to the US.

References

• “The Effects of the Cold War on U.S.-Haiti’s Relations”, Jean-Claude Gerlus, SUNY at Binghamton.
• “US Refugee Policy: A Comparison of Haiti and Cuba During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods” Evan George. University of Florida,